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Emotion is inherently embodied, formulated through bodily sensation, as well as expressed 
and regulated through action. Both expressing one’s own emotions and understanding 
the emotional actions of others are common areas of difficulty in autism. Moreover, reduced 
emotional awareness is also thought to be problematic in autism, and such difficulties 
may be mediated by impaired motor cognition. We aimed to examine how intensity of 
emotional experience and ability to differentiate between one’s own emotions relates to 
motor empathy and autistic traits. We hypothesized that greater motor cognition would 
be associated with greater emotional intensity and more refined emotion differentiation. 
Participants from the general population (N = 160) completed the Actions and Feelings 
Questionnaire (AFQ), a self-report measure assessing motor cognition, alongside the 
Broad Autism Phenotype Questionnaire and an emotion elicitation task. Motor cognition 
was significantly associated with more intense emotional experiences but not with ability 
to differentiate between similar emotions. Autistic traits, particularly social aloofness, 
predicted less emotion differentiation and lower scores on the animation subscale of the 
AFQ. We  suggest that whereas as intensity of experience may be  dependent on 
sensorimotor representation of emotions, differentiation requires additional cognitive 
functions such as language understanding. A dissociation between awareness of intensity 
and differentiation may be critical for understanding emotional difficulties in autism.
Keywords: emotional awareness, motor cognition, motor empathy, emotion differentiation, autistic traits, 
emotional granularity
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between action and emotion is central to theories of embodied cognition. 
Embodied cognition represents a general school of thought characterized by many theories, 
though best summarized with the general idea that the mind is rooted in the whole body, 
rather than being a piece of “software” installed in the “hardware” of the brain (Marmeleira 
and Santos, 2019). Within embodiment theories, interaction between the body and the environment 
drives the formation of perception, cognitions, and knowledge (Varela et  al., 2017), as well 
as emotion (Niedenthal et  al., 2005; Damasio, 2018).
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On a practical level, emotion is almost always accompanied 
by action, whether intentional (such as making planned 
movements to address the cause of an emotion) or unintentional 
(such as in a reactive facial expression). These actions serve 
to both regulate emotional experiences and communicate them 
to others. From a commonsense perspective, removing action 
from emotion eliminates much of the real-world context in 
which they are experienced. As such, a holistic science of 
emotion should also examine the role of motor action.
On a theoretical level, it has been suggested that emotional 
experiences evolved in order to motivate action (Damasio, 
2018), from both simple actions (such as seeking shelter to 
alleviate discomfort) to more complex, planned actions (such 
as comforting others due to a sense of sympathy). Actions 
and bodily experiences are also closely tied to how emotions 
arise on a moment-to-moment level. Interoception, awareness 
of one’s own bodily sensations has long been considered 
fundamental to how emotion arises (James, 1884; Damasio, 
1994; Craig, 2003; Critchley et  al., 2004; Seth, 2013), and 
contemporary constructionist accounts argue that emotion is 
constructed from interoceptive sensation (Barrett, 2017; 
Hoemann et  al., 2019).
Despite the growing body of work demonstrating the 
importance of bodily awareness to emotion, how action 
awareness relates to emotion is not a frequent topic of discussion. 
Yet empirical findings indicate that action influences how 
emotions are experienced. Strack et  al. (1988) found that 
participants asked to hold a pen between their teeth, stimulating 
the muscles involved in smiling, rated cartoons as more 
amusing. Similar effects have been found for other facial 
actions and ratings of emotions such as disgust (Lewis, 2012) 
and ratings of neutral stimuli (Mori and Mori, 2013) and 
others’ emotional states (Hyniewska and Sato, 2015). Moreover, 
patients who undergo cosmetic botulinum toxin injections, 
limiting the movement of their face, report diminished emotional 
intensity post-treatment (Davis et  al., 2010). This illustrates 
how one’s own bodily sensations and actions influence one’s 
own subjective experiences of emotion and judgments of others’ 
emotional states.
These facial and bodily feedback effects may be  central to 
how we  understand the emotions of others. Mimicry, the 
unintentional copying of others’ facial and bodily actions may 
form the earliest mechanism by which emotional labels and 
expressions are learned and understood. Allen and Heaton 
(2010) suggest that infants learn facial expressions corresponding 
to their own emotions by observing the caregiver’s mimicked 
facial expression. To give an example, an infant who feels 
happy and subsequently smiles will likely observe a mimicked 
smile on their caregiver’s face. This allows the infant to learn 
the connection between the experienced emotion and how 
this is expressed through action and language. In later life, 
these perception-action links may facilitate emotional contagion 
(Niedenthal, 2007; Decety and Meyer, 2008; Bird and Viding, 
2014), whereby just viewing the facial expressions of others, 
without mimicry, simulates the accompanying emotional state 
in the self. This emotional contagion mechanism forms the 
basis of more complex empathy (Van der Graaff et  al., 2016), 
allowing individuals to quickly identify and understand emotional 
states in others and respond to them appropriately.
An important step in this process is for individuals to identify 
their own emotional states and distinguish these clearly from 
the emotions of others. While the ability to recognize the emotions 
of others has long been a frequent topic of study in autism 
research, the role of awareness of one’s own emotions has largely 
been historically overlooked. Over the past decade, there has 
been a renewed interest in emotional awareness within mental 
health research. There is tremendous natural variability in how 
individuals identify and report their own emotional states (Barrett 
and Satpute, 2019). Such differences can be  seen both in terms 
of how strongly emotions are experienced, as well as how finely 
individuals differentiate between their own emotional experiences 
(Barrett, 2009). For instance, while some experience emotions 
as intense clearly differentiated states (e.g., discriminating feeling 
‘excited’ from feeling ‘hopeful’), others struggle to make these 
finer distinctions, experiencing emotion as generally “good” or 
“bad.” This ability to differentiate between one’s own emotions 
is thought to be  a key predictor of emotional regulation (Barrett 
et  al., 2001), as well as predicting socioemotional outcomes in 
a wide range of psychiatric disorders (Smidt and Suvak, 2015), 
including autism.
Within autism research, emotional awareness is largely 
measured through alexithymia. Alexithymia is a construct 
originally derived from work with psychosomatic patients 
(Sifneos, 1973), describing a common pattern of impoverished 
imagination, utilitarian thinking, and communication difficulties, 
particularly a dry and literal manner of speech. Such patients 
were noted to have difficulty identifying and describing their 
own emotional experiences, even when prompted to do so by 
therapists. In contemporary research, alexithymia is frequently 
defined as difficulties identifying and describing emotions (e.g., 
Bird and Cook, 2013). The original behavioral aspects (such 
as utilitarian thinking and literal speech) of alexithymia are 
often not discussed in contemporary research, although cognitive 
and affective subtypes of alexithymia have been proposed 
(Bermond et  al., 2010).
Most work on alexithymia in autism has relied upon self-
report questionnaires, most prominently the Toronto Alexithymia 
Scale (TAS-20; Bagby et  al., 1994). Autistic people tend to 
score more highly on these outcomes compared to non-autistic 
people (Hill et  al., 2004; Berthoz and Hill, 2005), indicating 
diminished emotional awareness. Recent meta-analytic work 
has confirmed these differences are consistent across studies 
using the TAS-20 (Kinnaird et  al., 2019). Moreover, Bird and 
Cook (2013) proposed that elevated alexithymia predicts greater 
difficulties with recognizing the emotions of others and 
diminished emotional contagion observed in autistic populations. 
Moreover, the contemporary definition of alexithymia has 
obvious conceptual similarities to emotional awareness and 
may be  considered to represent the “lower end” of emotional 
awareness abilities (Barrett, 2006). Alexithymia is also strongly 
connected to interoception (Brewer et al., 2016). Accumulating 
evidence suggests that greater interoceptive accuracy predicts 
lower alexithymia and thus greater awareness of one’s own 
emotions (Murphy et  al., 2018), and this association may have 
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significant implications for the etiology and treatment of mental 
health problems (Murphy et  al., 2017).
The action-perception-emotion links outlined above may 
be  particularly important in autism. It has long been noted 
that autistic children are less likely to imitate others compared 
to their neurotypical peers, and it is suggested that these early 
difficulties slow the development of social and emotional skills, 
causing cascading effects across the lifespan (Rogers and 
Pennington, 1991; Williams et al., 2001). Moreover, as imitation 
is suggested to facilitate recognition of others’ facial expressions 
(Niedenthal, 2007) and establish social rapport (Chartrand and 
Bargh, 1999), diminished imitation in development may lead 
to difficulties with emotion recognition and social success in 
autistic people later in life (Winkielman et al., 2009). Subsequently, 
motor cognition and empathy remain important issues in both 
the study of emotion and autism.
Yet compared to cognitive and emotional empathy, motor 
empathy has received relatively little attention in research. Moreover, 
few studies have examined motor empathy in conjunction with 
emotional self-awareness and autism. One potential reason is 
that measurement of motor empathy is usually challenging, 
requiring methods such as facial electromyography or visual 
action coding. Furthermore, motor empathy is often not explicitly 
measured in self-report measures of empathy (e.g., the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index; Davis, 1980). Potentially, the creation of a self-
report measure of motor empathy and cognition may allow for 
more diverse research in this field.
To address this gap in the literature, Williams et  al. (2016) 
developed the Actions and Feelings Questionnaire (AFQ), a 
self-report questionnaire intended to measure self-awareness of 
sensorimotor involvement in social and emotional behavior. The 
AFQ measures awareness of the emotional actions of others, 
one’s own use of imagery, and how frequently one uses gesture. 
AFQ scores are significantly lower in autistic than neurotypical 
adults (Williams and Cameron, 2017), demonstrating potential 
discriminative validity and aligning with the wider findings of 
diminished mimicry and imitation in autism.
Moreover, AFQ scores correlate with somatosensory cortex 
activation during facial imitation tasks (Williams et  al., 2016). 
Based on this, the authors argued that the AFQ assesses self-
awareness of emotional actions, and this awareness may predict 
emotional awareness. There is a commonsense logic to this 
proposal. If awareness of bodily sensations, as measured through 
interoception, predicts emotional awareness, it would follow 
that awareness of bodily actions may similarly facilitate more 
refined emotional awareness. If that is the case, higher AFQ 
scores may be  associated with less intense and more poorly 
differentiated experience of one’s own emotional experiences, 
which would subsequently predict greater difficulty understanding 
the emotions of others. Such a relationship may be particularly 
important in understanding the empathic and emotional 
difficulties seen in autism.
Despite these findings, the relationship of the AFQ to actual 
emotional experience has yet to be  explicitly measured. Our 
study aims to address this gap by comparing AFQ scores to 
experimental measures of emotional intensity and differentiation 
and to autistic traits. Based on the above literature, it is predicted 
that higher AFQ scores will be  associated with more intense 
and better differentiated emotional experience.
METHODOLOGY
Ethics
This study was approved by the University of Aberdeen School 
of Psychology Ethics Committee.
Participants
One hundred and seventy-one adult participants (31 males and 
140 females) were recruited from the Aberdeen area, through 
undergraduate participants’ pool, mailing lists, community 
advertisements, social media advertisements, and public 
engagement. Participants from the University of Aberdeen School 
of Psychology were offered course credit. All other participants 
were offered £10 cash to thank them for their time. Eleven 
participants were excluded from final analyses. Five participants 
had missing PED-task data due to a technical error, 5 did not 
complete the AFQ, and 1 had significant amounts of missing data.
Following exclusions, there was a final sample of 160 
participants (132 females and 28 males), with a median age 
of 20 (IQR  =  3; range  =  17–59). Of these 160 participants, 
148 were undergraduate students, 3 were post-graduate students, 
and 9 were non-students.
Emotional Intensity and Differentiation
Emotional intensity and differentiation were measured with 
an image-rating paradigm based on Erbas et  al.’s (2014) Photo 
Emotion Differentiation Task (PED task). In the PED task, 
participants view emotional images paired with different emotion 
terms, rating how strongly the image evokes each discrete 
emotional state. While Erbas and colleagues’ original paradigm 
exclusively used negative images and words, the current PED 
task also included positive images and terms.
It should be  noted that the PED task does not assess how 
accurately participants identify the emotional expressions of 
others. Instead, participants are asked to rate their own subjective 
emotional responses to the stimuli. This differentiates the task 
from popular tasks such the Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
test (Baron-Cohen et  al., 2001), which focuses on ability to 
identify the emotions of others. The fact that participants are 
expected to rate their own emotional responses, rather than 
the emotional qualities of the images, is stressed multiple times 
in both the oral and written instructions.
Emotional stimuli were taken from the Nencki Affective 
Picture System (NAPS; Marchewka et  al., 2014), 10 due to 
their high negative valence ratings and 10 due to their high 
positive valence ratings. Emotion terms consisted of five positive 
(happy, enthusiastic, amused, hopeful, and relaxed) and five 
negative (ashamed, nervous, angry, sad, and guilty) terms.
Each of the 20 images was presented with each of the 10 
emotion terms once, resulting in a total of 200 unique ratings. 
In each case, participants had to rate how intensely that 
particular image made them feel the given emotion term, on 
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a 0–6 Likert scale. A score of 0 indicated that they did not 
feel the target emotion in response to the image at all, and 
6 indicate that they felt the target emotion very strongly.
Participants first completed two practice items alongside 
the experimenter. The experimenter then ensured participants 
understood the task, particularly that they were expected 
to rate their own emotional experiences, rather than any 
inherent qualities of the image itself. After that, participants 
completed the experimental trials alone. Each image-term 
pairing was presented one at a time on a computer screen. 
The order of the image-term pairs was randomized for 
each participant. Participants could take as long as they 
wished to rate each item (see Figure 1 for diagram of 
PED-task procedure).
Indices of emotional intensity and differentiation were 
calculated from these ratings. Intensity reflects general strength 
of emotional response, whereas differentiation reflects how well 
participants discriminate between their own discrete emotional 
states. Details of how emotional intensity and differentiation 
were calculated can be  seen in the statistical analyses section.
The Actions and Feelings Questionnaire
Participants completed the Actions and Feelings Questionnaire 
(Williams et al., 2016), an 18-item self-report measure assessing 
awareness of action related to emotion. The AFQ assesses how 
aware individuals are of their own and others’ motor actions 
in social and emotional behavior. The AFQ is significantly 
correlated with Empathy Quotient (EQ; Baron-Cohen and 
Wheelwright, 2004) scores (Williams et  al., 2016) and shows 
good discriminant validity between autistic and typical populations 
(Williams and Cameron, 2017). Items are summed to produce 
total scores, with higher scores reflecting greater motor empathy.
The AFQ has three subscales: Feelings, Animation, and 
Imagery. The Feelings subscale reflects sensitivity to others’ 
emotionally expressive motor actions, assessed through items 
such as “I tend to pick up on people’s body language.” The 
Animation subscale reflects tendency to express emotion through 
body language, facial expression, and tone of voice, through 
items such as “I get animated when I  am  enthusiastic in 
conversation.” Finally, the Imagery subscale reflects how strongly 
and frequently people rely on action imagery, with items such 
as “In my mind’s eye, I  often see myself doing things.”
Autistic Traits
Autistic traits were assessed with the Broad Autism Phenotype 
Questionnaire (BAPQ; Hurley et  al., 2007), a 36-item self-
report questionnaire assessing the presence of autistic traits 
in the general population. BAPQ scores are significantly higher 
in the parents of autistic than non-autistic children (Hurley 
et  al., 2007; Sasson et  al., 2013) as well as in autistic than 
non-autistic adults (Nishiyama et  al., 2014). Previous studies 
suggest that the BAPQ outperforms comparable autistic trait 
measures in terms of internal consistency, convergent validity, 
and stability of factor structure (Ingersoll et  al., 2011). Finally, 
the BAPQ was explicitly designed to detect the presence of 
autistic traits in the general population, rather than to screen 
for autistic symptoms in a clinical group.
There are three subscales in the BAPQ: Aloofness, Pragmatic 
language difficulties, and Rigidity. The Aloof subscale reflects 
a lack of interest in or little enjoyment in casual social interaction, 
assessed with items like “I like being around other people.” 
The Pragmatic language subscale refers to difficulties in social 
language, such as in communicating ideas and holding reciprocal 
conversation, assessed with items such as “I find it hard to 
get my words out smoothly.” Finally, Rigidity reflects difficulty 
adjusting to change and preference for routine, assessed with 
items such as “I am  comfortable with unexpected changes in 
plans.” Scores are averaged to produce totals, with higher scores 
reflecting greater autistic traits.
Procedure
The current dataset is pooled from two different studies. In each 
study, the AFQ, BAPQ, and PED-task procedures were identical.
In the first study, participants also took part in two tasks 
not reported in the current study: a facial imitation task and 
an image judgment task. In the second study, participants took 
part in a different image judgment task alongside a working 
memory task.
FIGURE 1 | Outline of PED-task procedure.
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In both cases, participants took part in a quiet, private 
university room. The experimenter orally explained the study 
to the participant, taking informed consent after answering 
any questions and ensuring they understood the study.
During the first study, participants took part in the PED 
task first, followed by the other tasks, and finally the self-
report questionnaires. By contrast, participants in the second 
study took part in the image judgment task and working 
memory task first, followed by the PED task and finally the 
self-report questionnaires.
Statistical Analyses
PED-task data were used to calculate two outcomes of emotional 
self-awareness: emotional intensity (how intensely individuals 
responded to affective stimuli) and emotion differentiation (how 
well participants differentiated between discrete emotional states).
Emotional intensity was calculated through the mean emotion 
ratings for congruent image-word pairings (e.g., positive words 
with positive images). Average intensity was calculated with 
the mean of positive and negative intensity. These scores 
represented general strength of emotional response, with higher 
scores reflecting greater emotional intensity.
Emotion differentiation was calculated through intra-class 
correlations (ICCs) of congruent image-word pairings, in line 
with previous work (Erbas et  al., 2014, 2019). ICCs reflect 
strength of correlation between a participant’s ratings of the 
same emotional stimuli by different emotional terms. Higher 
correlations reflect application of emotion terms of the same 
valence to the same stimuli in similar ways, reflecting poorer 
differentiation between discrete emotional states.
Two-way random effects, multiple-rater ICCs with consistency 
(also known as Cronbach’s alpha) were used to calculate all 
differentiation scores (see Koo and Li, 2016, for full details 
on different types of ICCs). These were calculated for ratings 
of images across all emotion terms of the same valence (e.g., 
ratings of all positive images by all positive emotion terms).
Some differentiation scores fell below zero – 20 positive 
(11.9%) and 12 negative (7.5%) scores, in line with previous 
findings (Erbas et  al., 2019). As ICCs should theoretically 
only range between 0 and 1 (Shrout and Fleiss, 1979), it is 
unlikely these scores can be  meaningfully interpreted. In line 
with previous research using this method (Erbas et  al., 2019), 
these scores were excluded from further emotion differentiation 
analyses and remaining scores were transformed through 
Fischer’s r-to-z. Higher scores reflect stronger correlations 
between ratings of discrete emotional states and thus poorer 
emotion differentiation.
RESULTS
All scores were normally distributed (see Table 1 for averages, 
including averages by gender).
Due to the higher proportion of female than male participants, 
one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine gender differences 
in self-report and PED-task scores. No gender differences emerged 
in total AFQ scores [F(1, 158)  =  3.741, p  =  0.055]. No gender 
differences emerged in BAPQ scores [F(1, 158) = 0.420, p = 0.518].
Comparing PED-task outcomes, no gender differences 
emerged in positive intensity [F(1, 158)  =  0.126, p  =  0.724]. 
A significant difference emerged in negative intensity [F(1, 
158)  =  8.613, p  =  0.004], with female participants (M  =  3.14, 
SD  =  1.07) having more intense negative emotional responses 
to stimuli than male participants (M  =  2.51, SD  =  0.80). No 
gender differences emerged in emotion differentiation [positive 
differentiation: F(1, 138)  =  0.121, p  =  0.728; negative 
differentiation: F(1, 146)  =  0.290, p  =  0.591].
As gender differences were largely non-significant, gender 
was not controlled for in any further statistical analyses.
Broad Autism Phenotype Questionnaire 
and Actions and Feelings Questionnaire
Total BAPQ scores were significantly correlated with total AFQ 
scores [r(158)  =  −0.244, 95% CI (−0.384, −0.092), p  =  0.004]. 
To examine this relationship in greater detail, Pearson’s 
correlations between the subscales of the AFQ and BAPQ 
were conducted. To control for multiple comparison effects 
and Type I errors, Bonferroni’s multiple comparison correction 
was used, and minimum p value for statistical significance 
was subsequently set to 0.005. By these standards, AFQ Feelings 
was significantly correlated with BAPQ Aloof [r(158) = −0.301, 
95% CI (−0.436, −0.153), p  <  0.001] and BAPQ Pragmatic 
[r(158)  =  −0.397, 95% CI (−0.520, −0.257), p  <  0.001]. AFQ 
Animation was also significantly correlated with BAPQ Aloof 
[r(158)  =  −0.325, 95% CI (−0.457, −0.179), p  <  0.001] (see 
Figure 2 for scatterplots).
Photo Emotion Differentiation-Task 
Outcomes
Positive and negative intensity were well correlated 
[r(158)  =  0.548, 95% CI (0.426, 0.649), p  <  0.001], indicating 
TABLE 1 | Average and variances for all outcomes.
Full sample Males Females
Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
AFQ total 36.64 (6.40) 34.54 (6.15) 37.09 (6.39)
1. Feelings 18.99 (3.86) 18.82 (3.21) 19.03 (4.00)
2. Animation 10.79 (2.58) 9.54 (2.98) 11.05 (2.41)
3. Imagery 6.86 (2.42) 6.18 (2.21) 7.01 (2.44)
BAPQ total 2.75 (0.55) 2.81 (0.53) 2.74 (0.55)
1. Aloof 2.66 (0.77) 2.79 (0.61) 2.63 (0.80)
2. Pragmatic 2.69 (0.63) 2.76 (0.65) 2.67 (0.63)
3. Rigidity 2.91 (0.76) 2.88 (0.77) 2.91 (0.76)
Average intensity 3.16 (0.97) 2.94 (0.75) 3.21 (1.00)
1. Negative intensity 3.03 (1.05) 2.51 (0.80) 3.14 (1.07)
2. Positive intensity 3.29 (1.15) 3.36 (0.96) 3.28 (1.19)
Average differentiation 0.81 (0.28) 0.82 (0.28) 0.80 (0.28)
1. Negative differentiation 0.78 (0.36) 0.75 (0.34) 0.78 (0.36)
2. Positive differentiation 0.89 (0.39) 0.92 (0.42) 0.89 (0.38)
AFQ, Actions and Feelings Questionnaire; BAPQ, Broad Autism Phenotype 
Questionnaire. Differentiation scores have all underwent Fischer’s r-to-z transformation.
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that scores reflect general intensity of emotional response rather 
than positive or negative bias.
Positive and negative differentiation weakly correlated 
[r(128)  =  0.196, 9% CI (0.005, 0.364), p  =  0.026], indicating 
that participants tended to perform similarly when asked to 
differentiate between positive and negative emotions. A paired-
sample t test found a significant difference between positive 
and negative differentiation [t(129) = 2.844, p = 0.005], indicating 
that participants tended to differentiate more between negative 
than positive emotional terms.
To confirm differentiation was not simply an artifact of 
general emotional intensity, linear regressions were conducted 
to assess how intensity predicted differentiation. Negative 
emotional intensity did not significantly predict negative 
differentiation [F(1, 146)  =  3.568, p  =  0.061]. Similarly, positive 
intensity did not predict positive differentiation [F(1, 138) = 0.393, 
p = 0.532]. These findings indicate that differentiation is unlikely 
to be  an artifact of general emotional intensity.
Actions and Feelings Questionnaire and 
Photo Emotion Differentiation-Task 
Outcomes
Total AFQ scores were correlated with both positive 
[r(158) = 0.227, 95% CI (0.075, 0.369), p = 0.004] and negative 
[r(158)  =  0.173, 95% CI (0.018, 0.319), p  =  0.029] emotional 
intensity. These associations indicate that motor empathy is 
associated with more intense responses to both positive and 
negative emotional stimuli (see Figure 3).
Step-wise linear regressions were conducted to examine 
which AFQ subscales predicted positive and negative emotional 
intensity, respectively. AFQ Animation scores (β  =  0.181, 
p  =  0.022) significantly predicted positive emotional intensity 
[F(1,158)  =  5.379, p  =  0.022, R2  =  0.033]. Neither Feelings 
(β  =  0.105, p  =  0.202) nor Imagery (β  =  0.118, p  =  0.153) 
significantly predicted positive emotional intensity.
AFQ Imagery scores (β  =  0.221, p  =  0.005) significantly 
predicted greater negative emotional intensity [F(1,158) = 8.092, 
p  =  0.002, R2  =  0.043]. Neither Feelings (β  =  0.027, p  =  0.733) 
nor Animation (β  =  0.063, p  =  0.763) significantly predicted 
negative emotional intensity.
Total AFQ scores were not significantly associated with 
positive differentiation (r  =  −0.048, p  =  0.570) or negative 
differentiation (r  =  0.001, p  =  0.990).
Broad Autism Phenotype Questionnaire 
and Photo Emotion Differentiation-Task 
Outcomes
Total BAPQ scores were not significantly associated with negative 
emotional intensity scores [r(158)  =  −0.014, 95% CI (−0.169, 
0.141), p  =  0.859], but a weak correlation did emerge for 
positive intensity scores [r(158)  =  −0.175, 95% CI (−0.322, 
−0.021), p = 0.027]. These findings suggest that greater autistic 
traits were only associated with diminished positive emotional 
responses to positive stimuli.
Step-wise linear regressions were used to examine how BAPQ 
subscales predicted positive emotional intensity. The aloof 
FIGURE 2 | Scatterplot of AFQ scores against BAPQ scores.
Huggins et al. Aspects of Emotional Awareness
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 October 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 2439
subscale of the BAPQ (β  =  −0.340, p  <  0.001) significantly 
predicted lower positive intensity [F(1, 158) = 13.565, p < 0.001, 
R2 = 0.079]. Pragmatic language difficulties (β = 0.018, p = 0.832) 
and rigidity (β  =  0.133, p  =  0.117) were not significant and 
subsequently excluded from the model.
Total BAPQ scores correlated with average differentiation 
[r(128)  =  0.238, 95% CI (0.069, 0.394), p  =  0.006], indicating 
that greater autistic traits were associated with poorer 
differentiation of emotional states. This relationship was found 
between BAPQ and positive [r(138)  =  0.169, 95% CI (−0.027, 
0.329), p  =  0.046] and negative differentiation [r(146)  =  0.185, 
95% CI (0.031, 0.329), p  =  0.025].
Step-wise linear regressions were used to examine how BAPQ 
subscales predicted differentiation. Of the three subscales of 
the BAPQ, only the Aloof subscale (β  =  0.301, p  <  0.001) 
significantly predicted average differentiation [F(1, 128) = 12.787, 
p  <  0.001, R2  =  0.087] (see Figure 4). Neither Pragmatic 
language difficulties (β  =  0.059, p  =  0.655) nor Rigidity 
(β  =  −0.053, p  =  0.580) reached statistical significance and 
were subsequently excluded from the model.
A summary of the relationships between our main outcomes 
can be  seen in Figure 5. AFQ relates to emotional intensity 
and BAPQ but not to differentiation, whereas higher BAPQ 
scores predict poorer differentiation and are weakly associated 
with lower positive emotional intensity.
DISCUSSION
We examined how motor cognition and empathy, as measured 
by the AFQ, related to emotional intensity and differentiation 
in relation to autistic traits. The AFQ was designed to assess 
awareness of somatomotor representations of actions during 
social and emotional experiences and was therefore hypothesized 
to provide a measure of emotional self-awareness (Williams 
et  al., 2016; Williams and Cameron, 2017). Subsequently, it 
should follow that greater AFQ scores should predict emotional 
intensity and differentiation. We  found only partial support 
for this hypothesis. Greater scores on the AFQ were associated 
with more intense emotional responses to stimuli, supporting 
the notion that greater action-awareness is associated with 
more intense emotional experiences. However, AFQ was unrelated 
to ability to differentiate between similar emotional experiences. 
Instead, differentiation was associated with autistic traits, with 
greater social aloofness predicting less refined differentiation 
between one’s own emotional states.
Our findings first indicate that emotional intensity and 
differentiation can be  clearly distinguished from one another. 
Previous findings suggest that intensity and differentiation scores 
tend to correlate (Erbas et al., 2019), indicating that individuals 
FIGURE 3 | Scatterplot of AFQ scores against emotional intensity scores.
FIGURE 4 | Scatterplot of average emotion differentiation scores against 
BAPQ scores.
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who experience more intense emotional responses also tend 
to differentiate less between similar emotional states. This has 
raised concerns that differentiation scores may be  an artifact 
of – or confounded by – general emotional intensity. Yet, our 
findings showed no association between emotional differentiation 
and intensity. Moreover, differentiation and intensity were 
associated with different psychosocial outcomes.
Action awareness predicted more intense responses to 
emotional stimuli. This falls in line with previous studies 
indicating that bodily and facial action intensifies emotional 
experience (Strack et al., 1988; Davis et al., 2010; Lewis, 2012). 
Action awareness was not associated with ability to differentiate 
between one’s own emotional states. Instead, greater 
differentiation was associated with lower autistic traits, specifically 
the Aloofness subscale of the BAPQ. Aloofness scores reflect 
greater degree of disinterest in social interaction (Hurley et al., 
2007), and its association with differentiation may reflect the 
role of socialization in the formation of emotion concepts.
Contemporary constructionist accounts of emotion argue 
that discrete categories of emotion do not arise as natural and 
biological responses, but in fact socially and culturally learned 
categories are imposed upon our internal somatosensory 
experiences (Barrett, 2017). These categories of emotion are 
learned from infancy through socialization (Barrett, 2006; 
Hoemann et al., 2019), and greater exposure to emotion-related 
socialization predicts greater emotional awareness (Warren and 
Stifter, 2008). Much like with other types of learning, this 
emotional learning process is likely to continue throughout 
the lifespan. Those with greater social aloofness may be  less 
likely to socialize with others, have fewer opportunities for 
emotional learning, and thus show less refined use of 
emotion concepts.
The role of language and verbal IQ cannot be  neglected 
in this discussion. Emotional language forms a key part of 
how emotion concepts are formed (Barrett, 2006; Hoemann 
et  al., 2019). Subsequently, verbal IQ and language skill 
may be a key component of individual’s ability to communicate 
effectively about emotion. Supporting this idea, verbal mental 
age, not diagnostic status, predicted ability to detect emotions 
in music in autistic and non-autistic children (Heaton et  al., 
2008). Similarly, greater verbal ability significantly predicts 
ability to detect emotions in facial expressions (Montebarocci 
et  al., 2011; Fink et  al., 2014). Yet, these findings only 
reflect an individual’s ability to detect emotional content in 
external stimuli, not ability to identify one’s own 
emotional experiences.
Of greater relevance to the current study are findings from 
the alexithymia literature. Greater self-reported alexithymia is 
associated with lower verbal IQ (Montebarocci et  al., 2011), 
as well as with impaired language skill and damage to language-
related brain regions (Hobson et  al., 2018). Alexithymia is 
also associated with poorer semantic knowledge of emotion 
terms and less varied use of emotion terms (Wotschack and 
Klann-Delius, 2013). It must be noted that this work significantly 
differs from the current study, as these are based on self-
reports of alexithymia, rather than differentiation specifically. 
While little work has directly examined how verbal IQ and 
language relate to behavioral indices of differentiation, research 
does suggest that greater verbal IQ predicts more refined 
differentiation (Israelashvili et al., 2019). As such, while intensity 
may relate to somatosensory awareness, differentiation may 
instead draw upon the higher cognitive processes, such 
as language.
The distinction between intensity and differentiation observed 
here also bears a resemblance to the proposed distinction 
between affective and cognitive alexithymia found in the wider 
literature. While much research focuses on the cognitive aspects 
of alexithymia, such as difficulty identifying feelings, other 
researchers have suggested that there is also an affective 
component of alexithymia (Vorst and Bermond, 2001). Moreover, 
this affective component of alexithymia is largely neglected in 
the TAS-20. While cognitive alexithymia is characterized by 
deficiencies in the ability to identify, verbalize, and analyze 
emotions, affective alexithymia is associated with diminished 
emotional arousal and emotional fantasizing (Bermond et  al., 
2003). As such, there may be  subtypes of alexithymia – one 
characterized by both diminished emotion and accompanying 
cognition, and one wherein intensity of emotional experience 
remains intact, but cognition is impaired. These affective and 
cognitive components of alexithymia show clear similarities to 
the intensity and differentiation outcomes examined in our 
current study. Moreover, like our current findings, cognitive 
FIGURE 5 | Diagram showing relationships between main variables of interest.
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and affective alexithymia are suggested to be  independent. As 
such, an individual could have high emotional arousal but 
diminished ability to identify and articulate these emotions. 
Neuroscientific findings support this view, finding that cognitive 
and affective alexithymia are associated with different brain 
structures (Goerlich, 2018), indicating they are dissociable on 
a neural level.
While there is limited work examining cognitive and affective 
alexithymia in autism, existing research suggests that autistic 
participants have elevated cognitive alexithymia but no differences 
in affective alexithymia, compared to typical controls (Berthoz 
and Hill, 2005; Ketelaars et  al., 2016; Dijkhuis et  al., 2017; 
Ziermans et  al., 2019). This suggests that while autistic people 
frequently have difficulties with analyzing and describing their 
emotional experiences, there are no differences in the intensity 
of experience. This aligns with our finding that greater autistic 
traits are associated with diminished differentiation but not 
with lower emotional intensity. As such, our findings may 
be  interpreted as providing support for the cognitive/affective 
model of alexithymia.
While the cognitive/affective model of alexithymia usefully 
describes the different ways difficulties in emotional self-awareness 
may arise, there are some issues with this approach. Large-
scale psychometric studies have not found clear evidence of 
the proposed two-factor structure (Bagby et  al., 2009; Preece 
et al., 2017), leading to the suggestion that the proposed affective 
components are not a stable part of the alexithymia construct. 
As such, affective alexithymia and, by extension, emotional 
intensity may be  best understood not as part of alexithymia 
or emotional awareness per se, but as general emotional 
reactivity. Our findings support this notion, demonstrating that 
intensity is independent from differentiation, with dissociable 
psychosocial correlates.
There are a number of limitations to the current study. 
First, our findings are based on correlational, cross-sectional 
data. As such, the directionality of these relationships remains 
unclear, and the long-term implications remain relatively 
speculative. The correlations found were also relatively weak, 
but it should be noted that this is typical of studies comparing 
behavioral and self-reported measures of emotional competence 
(Brackett and Mayer, 2003; Lumley et  al., 2005), and many 
studies do not find any significant relationship at all. A potentially 
more pertinent issue is that emotion differentiation abilities 
fluctuate over time (Erbas et  al., 2018), particularly in line 
with changes in stress. It is therefore necessary to replicate 
these measures to ensure test-retest validity and control for 
the impact of psychological distress.
Second, findings are based on autistic traits in a typical 
population, rather than on clinical samples. Autism is increasingly 
recognized as a continuum, with autistic traits being dispersed 
dimensionally across the whole population (Wing, 1988; 
Constantino and Todd, 2003), making this a useful approach, 
particularly in terms of recruitment and ethics. Yet, this means 
that our findings may not generalize to clinical populations. 
The current study generates hypotheses for testing in populations 
with autism, particularly in relation to mental health outcomes 
and emotional regulation.
Finally, verbal IQ and language skill were not directly assessed 
in our current study. The sample was composed largely of 
university students and staff, making it likely that verbal IQ 
was generally high and of limited variability. Regardless, 
examining emotional and non-emotional language skills 
represents an important next step in examining how the different 
aspects of emotional self-awareness relate to motor cognition 
and autistic traits.
Our findings provide evidence that emotion differentiation 
is dissociable from general emotional intensity. Moreover, 
we  tentatively propose that while general emotional intensity 
relates to sensorimotor awareness and tendency, differentiation 
is related to social learning and may necessitate higher-order 
cognitive processes. In line with wider studies on autistic 
samples, autistic traits were associated with poorer differentiation, 
and this may relate to reduced opportunities for social learning. 
Distinguishing more clearly between differentiation and intensity 
in discussions of emotional awareness will allow us to more 
finely pinpoint where difficulties arise, and how they are 
best addressed.
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